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Abstract
The use of drones for the targeted killing of suspected terrorists has raised 
a number of complex legal issues for scholars and practitioners in field of 
international law. This paper will focus on the applicability of international 
humanitarian law in such situations and the characterisation of drone warfare 
as armed conflict. 
 In this context, the scope of armed conflict as a concept of international 
humanitarian law will be explored. In doing so, emphasis will be placed on the 
need for accountability to ensure greater compliance with international law.
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Introduction
The targeted killing of suspected terrorists has in recent years been a subject 
of considerable controversy, in particular since the killing of Qaed Salim 
Sinan al-Harethi in 2002 by a Hellfire missile shot by a Predator drone.(1) 
Concerns about the legality of such strikes have been raised by various UN 
Special Rapporteurs, including Philip Alston, the former Special Rapporteur 
Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary Executions.(2) In his 2010 report 
he stated that targeted killing by drones had led to a ‘highly problematic 
blurring…. of the boundaries of the applicable legal frameworks’.(3) Alston 
commented that the result ‘has been the displacement of clear legal standards 
with a vaguely defined license to kill’.(4)  The issue this paper seeks to address 
concerns the legal framework for the use of lethal force by armed drones, 
focusing in particular on the applicability of international humanitarian law.(5) 
(1) Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi was killed by the CIA in Yemen using an unmanned Predator drone on 3 
November 2002. See Chris Downes, ‘“Targeted Killings” in an Age of Terror: The Legality of the Yemen 
Strike’ (2004) 9 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 277–94; A P V Rogers, Law on the Battlefield (Ox-
ford University Press 2013) 50–1; Noam Lubell, ‘The War (?) against Al-Qaeda’ in Elizabeth Wilmshurst 
(ed), International Law and the Classification of Conflicts (Oxford University Press 2012) P.450.
(2)  Philip Alston, ‘Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, “Study on Ta -
geted Killings,”’ (28 May 2010) UN Doc A/HRC/14/24/Add.6  
(3)  ibid   
(4)  ibid  
(5) The use of armed drones engages a range of different legal issues, including rules of jus ad bellum.  This 
paper will focus on the implications for jus in bello.  For reading of a more general nature on the use of 
armed drones, see: Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin, and Andrew Altman, Targeted Killings: Law 
and Morality in an Asymmetrical World (Oxford University Press, 2012); Bradley Jay Strawser (ed), 
Killing by Remote Control: The Ethics of an Unmanned Military (Oxford University Press 2013); Dan 
Saxon, International Humanitarian Law and the Changing Technology of War (Brill, 2013); Marjorie 
Cohn and Desmond Tutu, Drones and Targeted Killing: Legal, Moral, and Geopolitical Issues (Interlink 
Publishing 2014); Sikander Ahmed Shah, International Law and Drone Strikes in Pakistan: The Legal 
and Socio-political Aspects (Routledge, 2014); James DeShaw Rae, Analyzing the Drone Debates: Tar-
geted Killings, Remote Warfare, and Military Technology (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Sarah Knuckey 
(ed), Drones and Targeted Killings: Ethics, Law, Politics (International Debate Education Association 
2014); John Kaag and Sarah Kreps, Drone Warfare (Wiley 2014); Steven Barela (ed), Legitimacy and 
Drones: Investigating the Legality, Morality and Efficacy of UCAVs (Ashgate, 2015); Aleš Završnik, 
Drones and Unmanned Aerial Systems: Legal and Social Implications for Security and Surveillance 
(Springer International Publishing, 2015); Peter Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg, Drone Wars (Cambridge 
University Press 2015); Jammel Jaffer (ed), The Drone Memos: Targeted Killing, Secrecy, and the Law 
(New Press, 2016); Ezio Di Nucci and Filippo Santoni de Sio, Drones and Responsibility: Legal, Philo-
sophical and Socio-Technical Perspectives on Remotely Controlled Weapons (Taylor & Francis 2016); 
Bart Custers (ed), The Future of Drone Use: Opportunities and Threats from Ethical and Legal Perspec-
tives (Information Technology and Law Series, Springer, 2016); Hugh Gusterson, Drone: Remote Con- =
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It will begin first by providing context for the use of drones and examining 
the significance of characterising a situation as one of armed conflict for the 
targeted killing of suspect terrorists. It will then examine the applicability of 
international humanitarian law to armed drones and the legal basis for the use 
of lethal force beyond the boundaries of the conventional battlefield. In light 
of the object and purpose of international humanitarian law, it will be argued 
that States deploying drones are obligated to comply with international law. 
Accordingly, it is only by adherence to the letter and spirit of the law that the 
military interests of a State engaged in armed conflict can be preserved. 
The Proliferation of Drone Technology and the Context for the Use of 
Drones in Armed Conflict
The technology enabling the use of drones can be traced back to the First World 
War.(6) Until 2001 drones were for the most part used only for reconnaissance.(7) 
They were employed for this purpose during the Vietnam War and in Kosovo.(8) 
Compared to other weapons, the advantages of using drones are many but 
a chief factor is that they avoid risks to State forces.(9)  Drones became an 
everyday reality with the initiation of the ‘war on terror’ and are now a weapon 
of choice for militaries across the globe.(10) Today, the proliferation of drones 
appears inevitable and, within a decade, it is predicted that almost every 
single country will have its own armed drones.(11) At the time of writing, nine 
trol Warfare (MIT Press 2016); Stuart Maslen, Nathalie Weizmann, Maziar Homayounnejad and Hilary 
Stauffer, Drones and Other Unmanned Weapons Systems under International Law (Brill 2018).
(6)  Ian G.R. Shaw, ‘The Rise of the Predator Empire: Tracing the History of U.S. Drones’ <https://unde -
standingempire.wordpress.com/2-0-a-brief-history-of-u-s-drones/ > accessed at 13 April 2019.
(7)  Mark Mazzetti, The way of knife, the CIA, a secret army and a war at the ends of the earth (Scribe 2013) 91
(8)  Josep Guerrero and Rogelio Lozano, Flight Formation Control, Chapter 1 1.22 Evolution of UAV’s, 
(ISTE Ltd, 2012) ; JD R. Dixon, ‘UAV Employment in Kosovo: Lessons for the Operational Com-
mander’ (Naval war college 2000). 
(9)  Peter W Singer, Wired for war: The robotics revolution and conflict in the 21st century (Penguin 2009) 
Pp.116-120 
(10)  For a discussion of how drones are defined, see: Roger Clarke, ‘Understanding the drone epidemic’ 
(2014) 30 (3) Computer Law & Security Review Pp.230-246.
(11) Defence one, ‘Every Country Will Have Armed Drones Within 10 Years’ (6 May 2014) < http://www.
defenseone.com/technology/2014/05/every-country-will-have-armed-drones-within-ten-years/83878/ > ac-
cessed 10 April 2019; The armed drones club has grown exponentially See Clay Dillow, ‘All of These Coun-
tries Now Have Armed Drones’ (Fortune, 12 Feb 2016) < http://fortune.com/2016/02/12/these-countries-
have-armed-drones/ > accessed at 19 July 2016;  seven countries have used armed drones in combat: the 
United States, Israel, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, Iraq, Nigeria, and Iran See New America, ‘World of 
Drones: Military’ < http://securitydata.newamerica.net/world-drones.html > accessed 10 April 2019.
=
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countries including the UK, USA, Pakistan, Turkey, Israel, Iraq, Iran, Nigeria 
and Azerbaijan are using armed drones in combat.(12) The rapid proliferation of 
drone technology among states and militant groups alike poses a new threat to 
the international community. Several non-state actors including ISIS, Hamas, 
Hezbollah, or Houthi rebels, have incorporated drones into their operations.(13) 
Employed by both State and non-state actors, drones pose a diverse range of 
complex challenges to the regulatory framework for the use of armed force. 
The section that follows focuses on one of these challenges: the characterisation 
of armed conflict for the application of international humanitarian law to 
operations involving the use of lethal force.  
The Characterisation of Armed Conflict
To determine the lawfulness or otherwise of lethal force by an armed drone, 
clarity is required on the applicable legal framework. The applicable legal 
framework is determined by the status of a situation: If the context is one 
of armed conflict, international humanitarian law will apply with significant 
implications for the use of lethal force.  The significance of characterizing 
a situation as one of armed conflict was commented on by Philip Alston, 
the former UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 
executions, in his Study on Targeted Killings:
Outside the context of armed conflict, the use of drones for 
targeted killing is almost never likely to be legal. A targeted 
drone killing in a State’s own territory, over which the State 
has control, would be very unlikely to meet human rights law 
limitations on the use of lethal force.(14)
As the existence of armed conflict has bearing on the legal framework for use 
of lethal force, it is essential to understand how situations are characterised as 
such under international humanitarian law.  The most authoritative point of 
reference for the characterisation of armed conflict is provided in the case of 
Prosecutor v Tadic before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
(12)  New America, “Who has What: Countries with drones used in combat”, <  https://www.newamerica.org/
in-depth/world-of-drones/2-who-has-what-countries-drones-used-combat/  > accessed 13 April 2019.
(13) New America, ‘Non-State Actors with Drone Capabilities’ < https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/
world-of-drones/5-non-state-actors-drone-capabilities/  > accessed 14 April 2019.
(14) UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on Targeted Kil -
ings, UN Doc A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, 28 May 2010, para 85.
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Yugoslavia.(15) In its Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
on Jurisdiction (the Tadic Jurisdiction Decision), the Appeals Chamber of the 
Tribunal defined the concept of armed conflict as follows:
[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to 
armed force between States or protracted armed violence 
between governmental authorities and organized armed 
groups or between such groups within a State. International 
humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed 
conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until 
a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of 
internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved.(16)
The definition propounded in Tadic Jurisdiction Decision was developed 
by the Tribunal as one of the tests required to determine the applicability of 
international humanitarian law for subject-matter jurisdiction over war crimes. 
In order for a situation to be characterised as one of armed conflict, there 
(15) For discussion of the definition provided by the Tadić Appeals Chamber see: Anthony Cullen, The 
Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press 2010) Pp.115–58.
(16) Prosecutor v Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 O -
tober 1995, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 70. This definition has been consistently applied in 
subsequent jurisprudence. See, e.g. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Trial Chamber Judgment, 7 May 1997, ICTY 
Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 561; Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic and Landzo, Trial Cham-
ber Judgment, 16 November 1998, ICTY Case No. IT-96-21-T, para. 183; Prosecutor v. Furundzija, 
Trial Chamber Judgment, 10 December 1998, ICTY Case No. IT-95-17/1, para. 59; Prosecutor v. 
Kordic and Cerkez, Trial Chamber Judgment, 26 February 2001, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, para. 
24; Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 26 February 17 December 2004, 
ICTY Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, para. 336; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, Trial Chamber 
Judgment, 22 February 2001, ICTY Case No. IT-96-23, para. 402; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and 
Vukovic, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 12 June 2002, ICTY Case No. IT-96-23, para. 56; Prosecutor 
v. Naletilic and Martinovic, Trial Chamber Judgment, 31 March 2003, ICTY Case No. IT-98-34-T, 
para. 177; Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber II, 31 July 2003, para. 
568; Prosecutor v Slobodan Miloševic, Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal (Miloševic 
Rule 98bis Decision), ICTY Case No. IT-02-54-T, 16 June 2004, para. 16; Prosecutor v. Blagojevic 
and Jokic, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber I, 17 January 2005, para. 536; Prosecutor 
v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber II, 31 January 2005, para. 215; Prosecutor 
v. Limaj, Bala, and Musliu, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, 30 November 2005, para. 84; Prosecu-
tor v. Orić, Judgment, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Trial Chamber II, 30 June 2006, para. 254; Prosecutor v. 
Haradinaj et al. , Judgment, Trial Chamber I, ICTY Case No. IT-04-84-T, 3 April 2008, paras. 37–49; 
Prosecutor v. Boškoski and Tarćulovski, Judgment, Trial Chamber II, Case No. IT-04-82-T, 10 July 
2008, para. 175; Prosecutor v. Boškoski and Tarćulovski, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, Case No IT-
04-82-A, 19 May 2010, para. 21.
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either had to be ‘a resort to armed force between States’ (international armed 
conflict) or a situation of ‘protracted armed violence between governmental 
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State’ 
(non-international armed conflict).(17) 
Once the existence of armed conflict is confirmed, international humanitarian 
law applies restricting the use of lethal force according to principles of humanity, 
distinction, proportionality and military necessity. For example, under the 
law of armed conflict commanders must take ‘[a]ll feasible precautions … 
to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury 
to civilians and damage to civilian objects.’(18)  It is prohibited to launch ‘an 
attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury 
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated’.(19) 
Rules concerning the use of lethal force under international human rights 
law are more stringent than under international humanitarian law.  As stated 
above by Alston, the use of armed drones is ‘almost never likely to be legal’ 
if that status of the situation does not render international humanitarian law 
applicable.(20) Although both bodies of law may apply simultaneously, in 
particular in situations of non-international armed conflict, the specific rules 
that will apply will require an assessment of the situation’s status. The section 
that follow considers the challenge this specifically poses to the extraterritorial 
use of drones.
The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to the 
Use of Drones
As mentioned above, international humanitarian law applies only where there 
is a situation of either international or non-international armed conflict. In 
either context, drones per se are not considered inherently indiscriminate or 
(17)  ibid
(18)  J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law: Volume 1, Rules 
(Cambridge University Press 2005), p. 51.
(19)  J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law: Volume 1, Rules 
(Cambridge University Press 2005), p. 46.
(20)  UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on Targeted Kil -
ings, UN Doc A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, 28 May 2010, para 85.
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perfidious.(21) The ‘use of drones is no different from a pilot dropping a bomb 
from a fighter jet, or a soldier firing a gun’.(22) A key issue determining the 
legality of the use of drones for targeted killing concerns the geographical 
scope of the law of armed conflict.(23) Vogel notes that controversies 
surrounding drone warfare are not really about the weapon itself but, inter 
alia, ‘defining the battlefield in a conflict with a transnational non-state actor’.(24) 
The geographic scope of the law of armed conflict has become a subject of 
considerable controversy, in particular since the initiation of US drone strikes 
in undeclared warzones after 11 September 2001. Given the geo-political 
significance of the United States, and its influence over the foreign policy of 
third States, this section will focus on the position adopted by the US for the 
extraterritorial use of lethal force by drones. 
The approach adopted by the Government of the United States after 11 
September 2001 – a position that has since maintained by different US 
government administrations – is that lethal force can be exercised without any 
geographic restriction provided the context is one of counterterrorism.  This 
interpretation of the law was provided in 2012 by John Brennan, then a Legal 
Advisor to President Obama:
As the President has said many times, we are at war with al-
Qa’ida … Our ongoing armed conflict with al-Qa’ida stems 
from our right—recognized under international law—to self 
defense.(25)
(21) ICRC, ‘The use of armed drones must comply with laws’ (10 May 2013) <https://www.icrc.org/eng/
resources/documents/interview/2013/05-10-drone-weapons-ihl.htm > accessed 12 April 2019 ; State-
ment of David Glazier, Hearing on Rise of the drones II: Examining the legality of unmanned target-
ing, (28 April 2010), Committee on oversight and government reform, House of representatives, One 
hundred eleventh Congress, Second Session, 29.
(22) Philip Alston, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions’ 
(2010) Human Rights Council Fourteenth session, Agenda item 3, para 79.
(23)  See generally: ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed 
conflicts, Doc. 32IC/15/11, Geneva: October 2015, Pp.12-16. 
(24) Ryan Vogel, ‘Droning On: Controversy Surrounding Drone Warfare Is Not Really About Drones’ 
(2013) The Brown Journal of world affairs, 1-2.
(25) John O. Brennan, ‘Strengthening our Security by Adhering to our Values and Laws’, Harvard Law 
School, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 16 September 2011, available at <https://obamawhitehouse.ar-
chives.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adher-
ing-our-values-an>.  
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The characterisation of the campaign as one of ‘armed conflict’ would have 
attracted less attention had it been limited to situations of active hostilities 
(for example, in Iraq and Afghanistan).  However, the US position on the 
geographic scope of armed conflict is not one consistent with State practice 
in the field of international humanitarian law.(26) The controversy generated 
by this more expansive approach to the use of lethal force was alluded to by 
Brennan: 
An area in which there is some disagreement is the geographic 
scope of the conflict. The United States does not view our 
authority to use military force against al-Qa’ida as being 
restricted solely to ‘hot’ battlefields like Afghanistan. Because 
we are engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qa’ida, the United 
States takes the legal position that—in accordance with 
international law—we have the authority to take action against 
al-Qa’ida and its associated forces without doing a separate 
self-defense analysis each time. And as President Obama has 
stated on numerous occasions, we reserve the right to take 
unilateral action if or when other governments are unwilling 
or unable to take the necessary actions themselves.(27)
Brennan acknowledged that ‘[o]thers in the international community—
including some of our closest allies and partners—take a different view of 
the geographic scope of the conflict, limiting it only to the “hot” battlefields.’(28) 
Indeed, the position of the UK government is substantially different to that of 
the United States.  Commenting on the qualification of US campaign as one of 
‘armed conflict’, Michael Fallon, the UK Minister of Defence stated: 
It is for the Americans to defend or describe their own 
definition. We would consider on a case-by-case basis, where 
there is an armed conflict between government authorities 
and various organised armed groups, and we would look 
at various factors case-by-case … such as the duration or 
(26)  However, see the position adopted by the US Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
(27)  Ibid. 
(28)  Ibid. 
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intensity of the fighting.(29)
The approach described by Fallon as UK Minister of Defence recognises the 
requirements that exist for the characterisation of non-international armed 
conflict under international humanitarian law.  As noted by the Trial Chamber 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the Musema case, 
‘whether a conflict meets the criteria of Common Article 3 is to be decided on 
a case by case basis.’(30)  Accordingly, an assessment of facts is necessary to 
determine the status of any given situation.  In order for a non-international 
armed conflict to exist, as established in the Tadic case, the hostilities must 
reach a certain threshold of intensity and the parties must possess a sufficient 
degree of organisation.(31)  The approach taken by the United States is to 
conceive the existence of non-international armed conflict in global terms, 
making it unnecessary to assess the status of individual situations.  As stated 
by Brennan, ‘we have the authority to take action … without doing a separate 
self-defense analysis each time.’(32)
US officials have claimed that the State is engaged in an ongoing armed conflict 
between ‘al-Qa’ida, the Taliban and other associated forces’.(33) In addition 
to the absence of any geographic restriction on the use of lethal force, this 
proposition is legally problematic because it imputes the actions of multiple, 
distinct non-state armed groups to al-Qa’ida.  In order to attribute the actions 
of an armed group to Al-Qaeda, some assessment is required of the level of 
(29) UK Parliament Joint Committee on Human Rights, Oral evidence: The UK Government’s policy on 
the use of drones for targeted killing, HC 574, Wednesday, 16 December 2015, 3.
(30)  Prosecutor v. Musema, Judgment and Sentance, Trial Chamber I, Case  No. ICTR-96-13-A, 27 Jan -
ary 2000, para. 251.
(31)  Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgement, May 7, 1997 at para 561-562 
(32)  John O. Brennan, ‘Strengthening our Security by Adhering to our Values and Laws’, Harvard Law 
School, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 16 September 2011, available at <https://obamawhitehouse.ar-
chives.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adher-
ing-our-values-an> Another issue with the US position is that the law of armed conflict is conflated 
with the law governing the use of force in self-defence. For collection of relevant US legal and policy 
documents (including John Brennan’s statement), see: Jammel Jaffer (ed), The Drone Memos: Tar-
geted Killing, Secrecy, and the Law (New Press, 2016).
(33) President Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President at the National Defence University’ (23 May 2013) 
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-
university > accessed 15 March 2019; Harold Koh, ‘US Legal Adviser, The Obama Administration 
and International Law’ (25 March 2010)< http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm > 
accessed 18 March 2019.
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control exercised by the leadership of al-Qa’ida over the armed group.(34)  The 
broad terms used to articulate the US position – referring to ‘al-Qa’ida and its 
affiliates and adherents’ – raises significant questions as to how assessments of 
status are undertaken for the use of lethal force.  How is ‘affiliation’ defined?  Is 
it necessary to be subject to chain of command or is mere association enough? 
No clarification has been provided on how ‘affiliates’ or ‘adherents’ qualify 
as legitimate targets.  This conflation opens the door for a policy of targeting 
that does not comply with the requirements by international humanitarian law. 
As noted by Christine Gray, ‘[i]t is the substantive law that is crucial, and it is 
here that the USA’s position is weakest’.(35) 
Given the issues that exist with the US position, and the fact that drones 
continue to be procured by other countries for similar use, how should the use 
of such weapons be regulated?  The section that follows posits some reflections 
on the application of international law, foreign policy, and the importance of 
third States ensuring accountability for the use of lethal force. 
Reflections on the Future of International Humanitarian 
Law and the Use of Force against Suspected Terrorists
One of the most fundamental prerequisites for the effective regulation of drones 
is clarity concerning the applicable legal framework. As noted by Christof 
Heyns, Dapo Akande, Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne and Thompson Chengeta, 
Though not inherently illegal weapons, drones do make the 
deployment of lethal force across borders much easier than before, 
and as such they pose significant risks to the protection of life. 
In this context the legal paradigm that is followed does make an 
important difference. If the assumption is that of a global non-
international armed conflict, to which IHL applies as the dominant 
legal regime, then it becomes much easier to justify lethal force, 
than if one takes the default legal framework of IHRL as the 
governing regime.(36)
(34) Kai Ambos and Josef Alkatout, ‘Has ‘Justice Been Done’? The Legality of Bin Laden’s Killing Under 
International Law’ (2012) Israel Law Review 341, 350.
(35) Christine Gray, ‘Targeted Killings: Recent US Attempts to Create a Legal Framework’ (2013) 66 
Current Legal Problems 75–p.106. 
(36) Christof Heyns, Dapo Akande, Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne and Thompson Chengeta, ‘The International 
Law Framework Regulating The Use of Armed Drones’ 65 (2016) International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly p. 826.
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Even in a situation where international humanitarian law applies and a drone 
strike is legal, the question must be asked as to ‘whether it is wise to do so’.(37) 
Accordingly, international human rights law should be taken as default legal 
framework.(38) ‘Such an approach is the only way in which force remains the 
exception, thereby protecting the right to life in the long term’.(39)
The importance of maintaining such protection is underlined by the changes 
that have occurred under the Trump administration with drone policy becoming 
‘less restrained, less transparent and less accountable’.(40) The following three 
changes were stated in a report issued by the Stimson Center: 
1) Expanding the targets of armed strikes by eliminating the 
requirement that the person pose an ‘imminent threat’; 
2) Loosening the requirement of ‘near certainty’ that the target is 
present at the time of the strike to a ‘reasonable certainty’, and 
3) Revising the process through which strike determinations are 
made by reducing senior policymaker involvement and oversight 
in such decisions and delegating more authority to operational 
commanders.(41) 
Another worrying development is the expansion of areas of ‘active hostilities’, 
with the designation three more provinces in Yemen as areas falling within the 
category.(42) A similar approach has affected operations in Somalia.(43) Such 
measures increase the likelihood of death and injury to civilians in these 
(37) Ib:d.
(38) Ib:d.
(39) Ib:d.   
(40) Rachael Stohl, ‘An action plan on US drone policy: Recommendation for the Trump administration’ 
(Stimson, June 2018) 31 <https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Stimson%20
Action%20Plan%20on%20US%20Drone%20Policy.pdf  > accessed at 8 July 2018
(41) Rachael Stohl, ‘An action plan on US drone policy: Recommendation for the Trump administration’ 
(Stimson, June 2018) 12 < https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Stimson%20
Action%20Plan%20on%20US%20Drone%20Policy.pdf  > accessed at 8 July 2018.
(42) Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt, ‘Trump Administration Is Said to Be Working to Loosen 
Counterterrorism Rules’, The New York Times, 12 March 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/12/
us/politics/trump-loosen-counterterrorism-rules.html.
(43)  Rachel Stohl, Under Trump, U.S. drone strike policy is looser and less transparent, (AXIOS, 14 June 
2018) 16 <https://www.axios.com/under-trump-us-drone-strike-policy-is-looser-and-less-transparent-
86c49069-b8eb-4a56-b950-b8b86004dc71.html > accessed at 10 April 2019.
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countries.(44) Under the previous policy, an attack could only be ordered if 
there was ‘near certainty’ that a target was present and civilians would not be 
killed or harmed. Now those planning an attack need only show ‘reasonable 
certainty’.  This undermines the protection provided to the civilian population 
under international humanitarian law, with significant implications for 
principles of distinction and proportionality.  Such policies set significant 
precedents and influence the behaviour of third States in their approach to the 
use of lethal force.  On account of this, and in light of the violations that have 
been reported, the use of drones requires scrutiny to ensure their compliance 
with international law.(45)
According to Heyns, Akande, Hill-Cawthorne and Chengeta,
There is an urgent need for the international community to gain 
greater consensus on the interpretation of the constraints that 
international law in all its manifestations places on the use of 
drones. This is important not only because of the implications for 
those who currently find themselves on the receiving end of drones, 
but in order to keep a viable and strong system of international 
security intact. A central component of such a security system is 
the rule of law. Drones should follow the law, not the other way 
around.(46)
The issue is one of compliance with international law.  In the context of armed 
conflict, the requirements of international humanitarian law must be adhered 
to.  If war crimes are to be prevented, the protection the law provides to the 
civilian population should be not be compromised.  In addition, international 
(44) The Economist, ‘How many civilians does America kill in air strikes?’ (4 April 2019) < https://
www.economist.com/united-states/2019/04/06/how-many-civilians-does-america-kill-in-air-strikes> 
accessed at 10 April 2019. 
(45)  Nehal Bhuta, ‘On Preventive Killing’, (EJIL:Talk!, 17 Sep 2015) < https://www.ejiltalk.org/on-pr -
ventive-killing/ > accessed 28 March 2019. 
(46) Written evidence from Christof Heyns, Dapo Akande, Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne and Thompson 
Chengeta (DRO0024), ‘The Right to Life and the International Law Framework Regulating the Use 
of Armed Drones in Armed Conflict or Counter-Terrorism Operations’, 10 December 2015, 46. See: 
Christof Heyns, Dapo Akande, Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne and Thompson Chengeta, ‘The right to life 
and the international law framework regulating the use of armed drones’ (2016) 65 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 791 at 826. See also: Summary of the Human Rights Council interactive 
panel discussion of experts on the use of remotely piloted aircraft or armed drones in compliance with 
international law: Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
UN Doc A/HRC/28/38, 15 December 2014, para 56.
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human rights law prohibits the deprivation of life.  As noted in the conclusions 
of UN Human Rights Council Expert Panel:
The starting point of any legal analysis on armed drones should 
be existing international law, in particular the prohibition 
against the arbitrary deprivation of life. Modifying well-
established rules of international law to accommodate the use 
of drones might have the unintended long-term consequence 
of weakening those rules. The existing legal framework was 
sufficient and did not need to be adapted to the use of drones, 
rather, it was the use of armed drones that must comply with 
international law.(47)
Conclusion
The challenge is one of ensuring greater compliance with international law. 
In addressing the obligation of States to ‘respect and ensure respect’,(48) it is 
instructive to recall the shared interests that bind the international community. 
These interests are reflected in treaties of international law such as the Charter 
of the United Nations and the Geneva Conventions of 1949.  They are also 
reflected rules of customary international law of an erga omnes nature: ‘States 
may not encourage violations of international humanitarian law by parties to 
an armed conflict. They must exert their influence, to the degree possible, to 
stop violations of international humanitarian law.’(49)
The obligation to prevent violations of international humanitarian law 
includes a duty to resist measures that undermine the protection provided by 
(47) Summary of the Human Rights Council interactive panel discussion of experts on the use of remotely 
piloted aircraft or armed drones in compliance with international law: Report of the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/28/38, 15 December 2014, 
para 56.
(48) Article 1 common to the four Geneva Conventions states: ‘The High Contracting Parties undertake to 
respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.’ Geneva Convention for 
the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, August 12 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of 
the Wounded and Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, August 12 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 
12 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, August 12 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
(49) J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law: Volume 1, Rules 
(Cambridge University Press 2005), p. 509.
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the law.  The characterisation of the campaign against al-Qa’ida or ISIS as an 
armed conflict of global dimensions weakens the framework upon which the 
applicability of the law is based. It also obscures the distinction that has existed 
from time immemorial between war and peace, with deleterious consequences 
for accountability.
The continuing lack of accountability for the extraterritorial use of lethal 
force creates fertile conditions for future conflict.  As such, it poses a 
pressing challenge for the maintenance of international peace and security.  If 
international peace and security are not protected, the threat to the international 
legal order is an existential one.  Accordingly, there is an urgent need for 
issues of compliance with international law to addressed. 
Dr. Sana Mir and Dr. Anthony Cullen
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